An alternative state to Istanbul in Anatolia: THE ANKARA ASSEMBLY

“Our Organization in Istanbul”

1918 was a disastrous year for the Ottoman Empire. The army had been defeated; Istanbul was effectively under occupation. Fearing retribution, the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, also known as the Young Turks) fled abroad, while instructing those left behind to continue the struggle for power.

Thus was born the Karakol Society. What is referred to in the book “Nutuk” (The Speech) by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as “our organization in Istanbul” is this society (I/267). Its aim was to protect the Young Turks remaining in the country from public vengeance; and for this purpose, to send them to Anatolia, establish a resistance movement there, and thereby regain power.

It organized the movement in Anatolia under the name of Defence of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk); it gave life to this movement by smuggling Unionist committee members and military supplies from Istanbul. Later, due to disagreements with Ankara arising from Soviet aid, the society was dissolved in April 1920. (Erich Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Nationalist Movement 1905–1926, pp. 118-119)

The Perfect Candidate

The parliament, composed mostly of Unionists, was dissolved. However, for a whole year, new elections could not be held. Why? There are two reasons: Due to the war, most of the country’s territory had been lost. Since a peace treaty had not yet been signed, these territories, though not de facto, still legally appeared to be under Ottoman sovereignty. If elections were held and representatives could not be elected from these territories, it would constitute an unlawful situation. Turks would have officially recognized the loss of these provinces. In other words, the de facto situation would gain legal status. The second reason was that the only organized power in the country was still the Unionists. Even if elections were held, it was clear they would control the parliament through force or other means.

Meanwhile, news came that gangs in the Black Sea region were putting pressure on the Greeks. This could provoke the Allies and expand the occupation. Fearing this, Istanbul sought to bring these societies under control and to hold a trump card during peace negotiations.

Zürcher states: “The policy of the Sultan and Damat Ferit Pasha systematically aimed to soften the Allied Powers, especially the British, in order to create goodwill towards the empire at the upcoming peace conference and minimize losses. (This does not mean they were not patriots.) There is no other action showing they were sympathetic to the nationalist movement. On the contrary, they did everything in their power to destroy it. Even after the nationalist cause triumphed, neither Sultan Mehmed VI nor Damat Ferit Pasha ever claimed to have initiated the movement.” (The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Nationalist Movement 1905–1926, pp. 168-169)

Taha Akyol says: “Can it be said that Sultan Mehmed VI assigned Mustafa Kemal for the national struggle? No. What Sultan Mehmed meant by [his words ‘Pasha, you can save the state’] was the prevention of incidents that could lead to a new occupation by the British. He thought that if such incidents were prevented, the establishment of Pontus and Armenia could be avoided.” (Ama Hangi Atatürk “But Which Atatürk”, p. 27)

Thus, the person selected to be sent to Anatolia was one of the sultan’s aides-de-camp, i.e., military advisers, Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The Pasha, who came from a Unionist background, was a popular figure and opposed to Enver Pasha, making him an acceptable name for the Allies as well.

The Republican People's Party's (CHP) politician Sabahattin Selek, in his famous work that won the Yunus Nadi award, states: “M. Kemal Pasha was among the leading commanders who had achieved success and fame during the war. In terms of the first quality required for the task, he was an excellent candidate. His opposition to Enver Pasha and the Germans, and his inability to get along with them, also provided the desired assurance. Since both the then-government and the sultan, as well as the British, shared a common view in their enmity towards Unionism and Germany, Mustafa Kemal Pasha could not be considered lacking in the second quality required for the task either. Indeed, while the British removed some army commanders like Ali İhsan Pasha and Yakup Şevki Pasha from duty and even arrested them, they did not touch Mustafa Kemal Pasha.” (Anadolu İhtilali “Anatolian Revolution”, p. 208)

An Alternative Government

But things did not go as Istanbul had hoped. The Pasha, gaining the support of the civil and military resistance movement, established an alternative/provisional government called the Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) in Sivas in September 1919. Moreover, a decision was made to hold new elections.

The famous historian Lord Kinross, who wrote Atatürk’s official biography at the request of the Turkish government, says: “In fact, Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists were being granted the authority to govern most of Anatolia. Truly, the Representative Committee had become the first revolutionary government. But since the Committee never convened, it was none other than Mustafa Kemal who ran things. He only stamped the Committee’s seal on papers to give the impression that things were done on its behalf.” (Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, p. 304)

The Pasha wanted the parliament to convene not in Istanbul, but in Ankara—a central city along the railway line and under his control. But when he could not get this accepted, he followed another path. (Kinross, pp. 309-310; Selek, Anadolu İhtilali “Anatolian Revolution”, pp. 314-315; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam “The Single Man”, II/209; Akyol, “Ama Hangi Atatürk” But Which Atatürk, pp. 111-112)

Meanwhile, governments sympathetic to the Anatolian movement began to come to power in Istanbul. The British first withdrew from Samsun and Merzifon, then from Eskişehir. Thus, western Central Anatolia came under Ankara’s control. Ankara was now secure. (Kinross, p. 306)

A Planned Game

The elections of 1919, in which the Allies did not interfere at all, mostly resulted in the victory of candidates supported by the Defence of Rights associations. (Selek, Anadolu İhtilali “Anatolian Revolution”, p. 315) The Chamber of Deputies convened in Istanbul on January 12, 1920. One-third of the 170 elected deputies did not attend the assembly.

Although there were 33 political parties, the new movement in Ankara did not allow anyone other than its own supporters to participate in the elections. (Taha Niyazi Karaca, Son Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Seçimleri “The Last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies Elections”, Turkish Historical Society, p. 229) Topal Osman prevented undesirable candidates in the Black Sea region from standing for election. Despite warnings, two candidates from Samsun, hearing that Topal Osman was coming after them, had to flee by boarding a ship. Although they were not desired, Rıza Nur from Sinop and Kadirbeyoğlu Zeki Bey from Gümüşhane were elected as deputies. (Avcıoğlu, III/1193-1194)

The Sivas Congress was essentially a party congress in which the cadres of the Committee of Union and Progress reorganized under a new name and guise. The Committee, which had been dissolved throughout the country, was restructured under the name Defence of Rights Association with Mustafa Kemal Pasha as its leader. The cadre, organization, and funds were the same.

This congress considered the Istanbul government illegitimate because no elections had been held and insisted on new elections. The committee formed at the congress took control of Anatolia. It cut off telegraph lines. The Istanbul government had to surrender. The Ali Rıza Pasha government, close to this movement, was formed and decided to hold elections.

In fact, no real election was held. The Defence of Rights associations sent delegates from all over Anatolia without any elections. These candidates were also determined by Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

When the sultan saw that most of the elected deputies had a Unionist mindset, he fell into despair; but he submitted in order to prevent Istanbul from being detached by the Allies. (Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Görüp İşittiklerim “What I Saw and Heard”, p. 252) As a matter of fact, Peyam-ı Sabah newspaper, in its January 4, 1920 issue, citing Pall Mall Gazette, reported that the capital would be moved to Bursa or Konya. (Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele “Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle”, II, p. 220)

Kemal Pasha was elected deputy of Erzurum; but he did not go to Istanbul because he feared being arrested. For Rauf Bey (Orbay), who had been elected deputy from Sivas, had informed him that he would be arrested if he came to Istanbul. In a telegram dated 30/I/1920, Mustafa Kemal wrote: “It has been reliably learned that the Allied Powers have suspended the arrest of the members of the Representative Committee here until the arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, since it is rumored that he is coming.” (In other words, the arrest of the members of the Representative Committee was postponed until the arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.) (Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri, “Atatürk's Circulars, Telegrams and Declarations”,  Vol. IV, No: 178.)

Government Crisis

They planned a plot to dissolve the parliament with Rauf Orbay, who had gone to Istanbul. The game that Rauf Bey, a member of the delegation that signed the Armistice of Mudros, was to play for the dissolution of the parliament was simply to cause a cabinet crisis. This would be in the form of toppling the existing cabinet by withholding a vote of confidence. A government would not be formed, the Sultan would dissolve the parliament, and thus Ankara would become the sole legitimate authority. It is stated in the “Nutuk” (p. 376): “In our communication to Rauf Bey on February 7, 1920, we conveyed the following thoughts: ... It is absolutely necessary to bring down the government unconditionally.”

Taha Akyol says: “Mustafa Kemal’s main policy against the government of Ali Rıza Pasha and the Parliament, in his own words, was to demonstrate the impossibility of a national cabinet in Istanbul and to ensure the relocation of the Parliament to Anatolia.” (Ama Hangi Atatürk “But Which Atatürk”,  p. 120) The deputies hesitated due to concerns that Ferid Pasha might come to power; but under pressure from the British and Ankara, Ali Rıza Pasha, caught between two fronts, could not hold out for long and resigned.

Rauf Bey says: “Eventually, the new cabinet was formed by Salih Pasha. With the establishment of this cabinet, the life of the Parliament began to shorten. We too, as a group, chose to remain spectators in this situation. Because in order to quickly achieve the main goal of establishing the National Government, this Parliament needed to be short-lived... In this situation, on March 11, I informed Mustafa Kemal Pasha with a telegram, again urgent and confidential, saying: Secret news given yesterday evening to a trustworthy person from a credible Italian source stated that the foreign representatives convened yesterday afternoon and accepted the matter involving an order from London for the arrest of the leaders of the National Forces in Istanbul; therefore, it was conveyed that such persons should leave Istanbul immediately.

We interpreted this either as a bluff by the opposition or as a move to bring Ferid Pasha to power, which would result in the dissolution of the National Assembly. In the first scenario, they would achieve their goals by creating a scandal when these individuals fled; in the second, they would move against the nationalists in cooperation with the Sultan’s Government and the Allied Powers by dismissing the Assembly through a vote of no confidence and making mass arrests. Of course, in both cases, we will not go anywhere from here and will carry out our honorable duty until the end. Salih Pasha is knowingly causing this situation. Therefore, as we have stated before, we will work extremely hard to bring down this colorless new cabinet, and we are confident that we will succeed.” (Siyasi Hatıralarım “My Political Memoirs”, pp. 266–267)

Later, Mustafa Kemal would harshly accuse Rauf Orbay and his team, who would eventually become among his opponents, for failing to establish a disciplined group in Parliament under the name of Müdafaa-i Hukuk and for not electing him as its president (Nutuk, “The Speech”, pp. 360–361).

Mazhar Müfit Kansu, a close associate of Mustafa Kemal and deputy of Hakkari, recounts: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha desired the presidency of the parliament from a different viewpoint, with a different intention. He explained this to his close circle, but of course not to everyone. The idea was this: The parliament would not continue in Istanbul. He was convinced that it would inevitably be attacked and dissolved. At that time, as the president of the parliament, he would have the right and authority to call the deputies to meet in Ankara.” (Erzurum’dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk’le Beraber, “With Atatürk From Erzurum Until His Death”, Vol. II, p. 572)

During the Sivas Congress, while discussing where the parliament would convene, Rauf Bey said the Sultan would eventually dissolve the parliament anyway, thus paving the way for a new assembly to be convened in Anatolia; Mustafa Kemal also agreed with this idea (Kinross, Vol. I, pp. 309–310). Indeed, in his memoir “Siyasi Hatıralarım” (Vol. I, pp. 286–287), Rauf Orbay recounts the following conversation with Kazım Karabekir:

[Karabekir says:] “Even if we assume that we successfully gather the majority of the deputies in Anatolia – since this would be done contrary to the will of the Sultan and the government in Istanbul – we would very likely face objections, even uprisings, from that government and parts of the people who still regard it as legitimate. Many supporters of the Sultan and his government, both in Istanbul and in Anatolia, who have been waiting for a chance to act against us, would seize this opportunity and accuse us of bad intentions, saying: (These people have no good intentions. A few ambitious men are disturbing the peace with dreams of forming their own government, even a republic. They are dragging the nation into ruin through constant conflict. They demanded a cabinet of honest and honorable men, and it was granted. Just when peace was about to be achieved, look what they’re doing.) With such propaganda, they would not only incite public opinion against us but could also provoke the Sultan and his Allied protectors to attack us with renewed hope. What would we tell the public then? Whatever we say, who would believe us?

For the successful establishment of the National Government, it is essential that the parliament first convene in Istanbul. This parliament has no future or prospect. The Allied Powers will not change the decisions they have made about us just because the parliament convenes. On the contrary, they will consider the deputies, who they will view as the outcome of the National Forces, as targets—especially the British, who will seize and exile them at the first opportunity. That day will be the best day to establish the National Government. Because then the situation will be such that any person of honor and conscience will see it clearly, the treason—or at least the stupidity—of the Sultan and his government will be universally acknowledged, and our National Government will rise in the heart of Anatolia like the sun. But even then, Eskişehir will be in danger. It would be better to retreat west of Ankara.”

Upon this, Rauf Bey says: “In case the British do not do this, in order to make sure this happens, I accept the danger. I will go to Istanbul to the Parliament, and if your prediction doesn’t come true, I will detonate a bomb in the middle of the Parliament and sacrifice myself so that you can succeed in establishing the National Government in Anatolia.”
Rauf Bey also says: “In fact, the Parliament had already done what needed to be done with its work up to that day. It would pass the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî) through the Assembly, and it did. Now, to achieve our main goal, all that remained was to have the Parliament raided. The main goal was to ensure that the Parliament would definitely be raided by the British. Without this, neither a National Assembly nor a National Government could be established in Anatolia. It was known that we had agreed on this point with Mustafa Kemal Pasha months ago.” (Rauf Orbay, Siyasi Hatıralarım, “My Political Memoirs”,  Vol. II, pp. 28, 31)

Gaining Time

In his book “Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları” (Memoirs of the War of Independence), Yunus Nadi confirms the incident by quoting Rauf Bey as saying, “I want the assembly not to dissolve itself, but to be dissolved. I consider it a duty upon myself.” (pp. 179–180) Cemal Kutay also says, “The protagonist of the event is Rauf Bey, who came to Istanbul with this purpose.” (Bilinmeyen Tarihimiz “Our Unknown History”, III/235)

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk says: “I was absolutely expecting that the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies would be subjected to an assault and dissolved in Istanbul. In this case, I had already initiated the necessary measures to be taken. Our preparations and arrangements had begun. To convene in Ankara.” While carrying out this duty, I also thought of a precaution to avoid misunderstanding by the nation: to be elected as the president of the Chamber of Deputies.” (Nutuk, “The Speech”, pp. 361–362)

Atatürk states that his main intention was not to go to Istanbul but to gain time; that he planned to invite the deputies to Ankara with their current titles once the assembly was dissolved; however, the “irrational and unreasonable” individuals in the assembly did not elect him as president. (Nutuk, “The Speech”, p. 363)

Lord Kinross says, “Mustafa Kemal believed that the assembly would be dissolved sooner or later. If he became the president of the assembly, this title could strengthen his position and give him the ability to convene a new assembly.” (Vol. I, p. 314)

Sabahattin Selek says: “The Anatolian Revolution, which established its presence through the Sivas Congress, henceforth began striving for legitimacy. For this purpose, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was waiting for an opportunity. If he could make his idea accepted and have the national assembly convene in Ankara, a great milestone would be swiftly achieved. Since the Pasha knew that the opportunity he sought would come to him, he patiently waited for the events to unfold. A disaster befalling the Istanbul assembly was inevitable. He had warned the deputies about this before they even left for Istanbul.” (Anadolu İhtilali, “Anatolian Revolution”, p. 324) This warning appears in Nutuk as follows: “The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the arrest or exile of its members from Istanbul is not a distant possibility.” (Nutuk, “The Speech”, p. 275)

The Only Valid Decree

The outcome that could not be achieved by toppling the cabinet was obtained by an entirely different method. When the Chamber of Deputies adopted the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî), which was an enthusiastic manifesto of peace, in a group meeting (not in the general assembly), the British used this as a pretext, claiming it overstepped its bounds, and raided the assembly on March 16. The assembly then dissolved itself. Thus, perhaps unknowingly, it paved the way for Ankara.

Mustafa Kemal had learned beforehand that the British would occupy Istanbul; he informed his friends in Istanbul with a telegram dated February 6, 1920. (Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri, “Atatürk's Circulars, Telegrams and Declarations”,  no. 185; Aydemir, Tek adam “The Single Man”, II/230–231)

Meanwhile, the Unionists organized rallies in Sultanahmet Square in Istanbul that had the nature of uprisings. There was a possibility they might attack prisons and rescue war criminals. As a result, the British decided to arrest and exile these provocateurs. During this time, a few members of the assembly were also arrested. Thereupon, the assembly dissolved itself (i.e., it was not forcibly closed).

Some prominent deputies were exiled to Malta by the British; some were allowed to pass to Ankara. Thus, what Mustafa Kemal Pasha wanted came to be; Ankara became the center of resistance, and he became its undisputed leader. (Sabahattin Selek, p. 326; Taha Akyol, Ama Hangi Atatürk “But Which Atatürk”, pp. 133, 135) This planned operation was carried out by Rauf Orbay, the deputy of Sivas.

Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, Mustafa Kemal’s general secretary and the first president of the Turkish Historical Society, says in his book "Atatürk Anadolu’da" (Atatürk in Anatolia) (p. 105): “With the decisions made during the Amasya meeting (October 21, 1919) between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Salih Pasha, the representative of the Ali Rıza Pasha government, the Istanbul government came under tighter control of Anatolia. Although he did not place his own men, Mustafa Kemal had fully taken the Istanbul government under his influence. The occupation of Istanbul can be seen as a result of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s strengthening in Anatolia. Moreover, the occupation of Istanbul, after the occupation of Izmir by the Greeks, was the second event that helped the national struggle and resistance gain support among the public. These injustices and assaults should not have occurred. Since they did, and since they were beneficial for the victory of the national struggle, we should be grateful to England.”

Ertan Ünal, in his article “16 Mart Vakası” (The March 16 Incident), which describes the second occupation of Istanbul, writes: “As a matter of fact, upon receiving the news of the raid on Şehzadebaşı Police Station from the telegraph operator Hamdi from Monastir, Mustafa Kemal Pasha said, ‘I never imagined that the British would commit such a blunder. They couldn’t have done us a greater service. Now we can convene the assembly in Ankara and lay the foundations of the new state.’” Indeed, time proved Mustafa Kemal right. For the two consecutive mistakes—first the Greek occupation of Izmir, and ten months later the British occupation of Istanbul—not only failed to extinguish nationalist movements, but on the contrary, ignited them further and caused the number of people who believed in Mustafa Kemal to increase rapidly. (Hayat Tarih, “Life History Magazine”,  March 1969, p. 25)

Halil İnalcık states that the occupation strengthened the movement led by M. Kemal. (Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, “Atatürk and Democratic Turkey”, p. 16) Lord Kinross says, “In truth, with two incidents—the dispatching of the Greeks to Anatolia and the occupation of Istanbul—the Allied Powers ensured that the only valid decree in Türkiye would be that of Mustafa Kemal. Once again, the British had made a great political gift to Mustafa Kemal. And he did not delay in making use of it.” (Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, Vol. I, pp. 325–326)

Following the World War, in parallel with global trends of change, Ottoman political institutions were also shaken. The public was sick and tired of the committee members whose reputation had hit rock bottom. They were weary of the years-long wars. The country was devastated; not a stone was left upon another. Most of the male population had died, schools were closed, trade had ceased. Epidemics were sweeping through.

It was not easy to tear this down and build a new state in its place. The emergence of a new perception of legitimacy—where someone could say, “we hold the power, we collect the taxes, we conscript the soldiers, the courts are in our hands”—was extraordinarily risky. The public could easily dismiss this too. This was the starting point of the decentralists. Having gotten rid of the old state, they questioned the need to establish a new one. This idea sounded appealing to many. It is no feat to convene a new assembly. Anyone can gather people. But to establish and make accepted the claim that this assembly is the state’s assembly and the representative of the nation is extremely difficult. It requires a fine psychological, organizational, and armed operation.

The great political mastery of the Anatolian movement lies in this: First, in Sivas, the Istanbul government was forced into an election through a fait accompli, even though a legitimate and free election was not possible. Then this assembly was transferred to Ankara. Afterwards, through additions and modifications, the new assembly of the new state was formed. Through laws like the Commander-in-Chief Law, all powers of the assembly were concentrated in a single hand. With military victories and the elimination of opponents, a new state was established.

An Insurance Policy?

The new assembly convened on April 23, 1920, with 115 members in a new and monumental two-story building made of Ankara stone, which had formerly served as the Committee of Union and Progress clubhouse in Ulus.

In the album published by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Volume I/3), it states: “The building, whose roof had not yet been completed, was used as a barracks by a small detachment of French troops who occupied Ankara after World War I and was vacated upon the arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The unfinished structure was completed with the contributions of the people of Ankara. The roof tiles were taken from the roofs of Ankara residents’ homes, the deputies’ benches were brought from the Ankara Teachers' School, and the necessary furniture was obtained from government offices. Gas lamps were brought from coffeehouses, and stoves were installed for heating.”

The opening of the assembly was scheduled for a Friday. Before the opening, prayers were performed at Hacıbayram Mosque, supplications were made, sacrificial animals were slaughtered, and recitations from Sahih al-Bukhari were read. A Qur’anic verse meaning “Their affairs are [conducted] by mutual consultation” was hung on the wall of the assembly hall. These were ceremonies not even seen in the Ottoman State. (Kinross, I/335-336)

Kazım Karabekir stated: “In our history, no assembly has ever been opened with such a strictly bigoted religious ceremony. This grand celebration, which followed the issuing of fatwas—could it have been intended as a kind of insurance policy against the uprisings that were beginning to break out in various places?” (İstiklal Harbimiz, “Our Independence War”, 656)

On one hand, a respectful attitude was displayed toward the sultan; on the other hand, a policy heavily criticizing the Istanbul governments was pursued; the provinces of Anatolia were gradually tied to Ankara either peacefully or by force. (Selek, Anadolu İhtilali “Anatolian Revolution”, 314)

Not all the deputies in Istanbul traveled to Ankara. There was a war going on, and crossing over to Anatolia was risky. Moreover, this act of crossing was seen as a crime. Ankara sent a communiqué to all provinces and the Defense of Rights Associations (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri), requesting five “patriots” from each district to be sent. However, not all of these individuals went or were able to go to Ankara.

The Assembly Government

The election of the Speaker was also quite interesting. Mustafa Kemal Pasha received 110 votes; Celaleddin Arif Bey, a law professor and the Speaker of the Istanbul-based parliament—who by all rights should have been considered the Speaker of this assembly as well—received 109 votes; and Abdülhalim Çelebi received 91 votes. The reason the number of votes exceeded the number of attendees (120) was that the voting was conducted separately for each nominee. In other words, in a rather strange manner, some people voted for both candidates. Thus, Kemal Pasha—who had never before competed against anyone—became the Speaker of the Assembly, Celaleddin Arif Bey was made the deputy speaker (reis-i sani), and Abdülhalim Çelebi was made the second deputy speaker (reis-i sani vekili).

Kemal Pasha continued in this position until October 29, 1923, when he was elected president. First, he gave a speech praising the sultan and declaring that they were his obedient subjects: “God willing, I implore from divine grace that our world-protecting sultan remains on his exalted throne in good health, free from all forms of foreign domination.”

The fact that the assembly behaved as a continuation of the Istanbul-based Meclis-i Mebusan (Ottoman Chamber of Deputies) is evident from its decision to first address a proposal related to the livestock tax (ağnam vergisi), which the Meclis-i Mebusan had been unable to finalize. Thus, a basis for legitimacy was established for the assembly, and the impression was given that the movement was not a rebellion. (Selek, Anadolu İhtilali “Anatolian Revolution”, 342)

Nonetheless, the assembly was presented as the sole authority over all acts in the country. As the deputy from Trabzon, Ali Şükrü Bey, put it, this was a revolutionary assembly. (Journal of Proceedings of the Grand National Assembly, Vol. 4, 8.9.1920, p.24) In fact, Hasan Basri Çantay, deputy from Balıkesir, openly declared from the assembly podium in August 1920 that he did not recognize the caliph. (Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, 25.9.1920, 1st Term, Vol. 1, p.132)

Indeed, in a declaration issued by the assembly to the nation on April 25, 1920, and read from the podium by Hamdullah Suphi, it was stated: “We, your deputies, swear in the name of Almighty God and His Noble Messenger that the claim of rebellion against the Sultan and Caliph is nothing but a lie.” (Hakimiyet-i Milliye Gazetesi, “National Sovereignty Newspaper”, April 27, 1920, No:25)

With the Law on the Organization of Government (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu) in 1921, the assembly declared that it held legislative, executive, and judicial power. For provisions not included in the law, the Ottoman Kanun-ı Esasi (Constitution) was applied.

In this system, called the “Assembly Government,” the parliament was powerful; a council operating under the roof of the assembly carried out executive duties like a cabinet. There was no prime minister or president, because Mustafa Kemal Pasha—under the influence of Rousseau—was strongly opposed to the separation of powers. (Selek, Anadolu İhtilali “Anatolian Revolution”, 336; Taha Akyol, Atatürk’ün İhtilal Hukuku, “Atatürk’s Revolutionary Law”, 56)

Neo-Unionism?

At first, the assembly was called the National Assembly. Later, in addition to the Assembly of Deputies, it was called the Grand National Assembly in the sense of an "expanded assembly"; in 1921, the word Türkiye was added, and it became the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye.

Its members were no longer called deputies (mebus), but rather "Representative of the Nation" (milletvekili) to give the impression that everything was temporary. These were chosen not by the people but by provincial, district, and municipal councils and secondary electors under the directive of the Association for the Defence of Rights.

From 66 districts, 349 people gradually came to Ankara, as well as 82 members of the dissolved Istanbul assembly. In 1922, 14 former Istanbul assembly members who had returned from Malta also joined. The total number of the assembly was 437. Those who did not or could not attend numbered 30.

The assembly even included representatives from Batum, which was later ceded to the Soviets. Towns like Biga, Doğubayezid, Ergani, Gallipoli, Genç, Oltu, and Şebinkarahisar, which are now districts, sent representatives because they were sanjaks at the time.

The members of the new assembly came from various professional and social classes: 36% were civil servants, 34% were self-employed, 15% were soldiers, and 9% were scholars. 42% had higher education. 60% knew a foreign language. 42% were between the ages of 35 and 40. Although the members, with their turbans, fezzes, kalpaks, and scarves, appeared heterogeneous in appearance, their mentalities were actually quite similar.

The Committee of Union and Progress, which had held power for 10 years, had managed to establish an organization in the provinces and was strong. For this reason, the vast majority of members of the assembly were either Unionists themselves or sympathizers. Zürcher says, “The occupation of Istanbul by the British gave Mustafa Kemal the opportunity to turn the underground Unionist organization in the occupied territories into a submissive tool.” (p.178) The Ankara Movement was in a sense seen as a Neo-Unionist movement. This is one reason why Istanbul maintained a cautious stance towards Ankara and why there were popular uprisings. (Zürcher, 178)

Even though non-Muslims still made up a significant part of the population, not a single non-Muslim member of the assembly existed. This is another issue that casts a shadow over the democratic nature of the assembly.

All members of the assembly, without exception, were former Union and Progress and new Association for the Defence of Rights members. They all represented a single political view and preference. There was no one among them who had not pledged allegiance to the revolutionary regime in Ankara. The National Assembly was essentially a party congress.

The assembly, active between 1920–23, was very lively and passionate. It witnessed heated political struggles. At that time, no organization or authority capable of fully controlling the assembly had yet been formed. Therefore, various disagreements arose. Two of these were significant.

One was about how centralized the new regime would be. The idea of local autonomy was proposed not only for the Kurds but also for Circassians, Laz people, and even provinces like Konya.

The second was the ideological divide within the organization between supporters of Enver Pasha and those who were not. This split turned into a radical ideological and strategic divergence in 1921. At the beginning of the movement, some of its members saw Mustafa Kemal Pasha as someone who would manage affairs until Enver returned. Others suspected that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was a man of the British. Once he concentrated all powers in his hands through the law of the commander-in-chief and purged his opposition, these people realized what was happening. This conflict ended with Enver giving up hope on Anatolia and his subsequent death.

No matter how many conflicts there were, in all critical decisions, Mustafa Kemal Pasha dominated the assembly. What he said was done. Because military power was in his hands. The opposition was never able to win a single vote.

A Maiden-like Assembly

According to what Atatürk recounted in the “Nutuk” (pp.661–662), when Ankara’s troops were defeated in Eskişehir and Kütahya, and Greek forces approached Ankara—in other words, when the military situation became critical—on August 5, 1921, the powers of the assembly, that is, the presidency of the assembly, the presidency of the executive council (government), and the commandership-in-chief, were transferred to Kemal Pasha. After the third extension on May 5, 1922, when the assembly attempted to reclaim these powers, he defied them and effectively became the ruler of the state.

To this end, with the army behind him—and as he had previously considered twice—he consulted İsmet İnönü and Kazım Karabekir via telegram about dissolving the assembly, but once the crisis was resolved, there was no need. (Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, “Our Independence War”, 1116; İsmet İnönü, Hatıralar, “Memoirs”, 377–378; Taha Akyol, Atatürk’ün İhtilal Hukuku, “Atatürk’s Revolutionary Law” 164–170) What İnönü said at that time is important: “Our only basis of legitimacy is this assembly. If we dissolve it, we become a gang of adventurers playing soldier.”

Lord Kinross wrote, “Thus, for a period of three months, Mustafa Kemal became a military dictator.” (Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, p.417) Falih Rıfkı Atay wrote: “Mustafa Kemal not only wanted to be commander-in-chief, but also demanded the right to use the powers of the assembly as commander-in-chief. This is called dictatorship.” (Çankaya, p.292)

On July 30, 1930, in Yalova, when he gave instructions to Fethi Okyar to establish an opposition party, even if it was a controlled one, he said: “Our current situation is more or less that of a dictatorship. Indeed, there is an assembly, but at home and abroad, they look at us as a dictatorship. Last year, one of the German writers who visited Ankara, Emil Ludwig, asked me strange questions about our system of governance and, having concluded that we were a dictatorship, returned and wrote about it. However, I did not create the republic for my own personal interests. We are all mortal! After I die, the institution that will remain behind is a despotism. But I do not want to leave a despotic institution to the nation as my legacy or go down in history that way!” (Ali Fethi Okyar, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu nasıl Feshedildi, “How the Free Republican Party Was Born and Dissolved”, p.12)

Civilian Coup

The verse "Their affairs are [conducted] by mutual consultation" was removed from the wall and replaced with the inscription "Sovereignty belongs to the nation." Thus, the Ankara Assembly, which had been convened to save the homeland from the enemy and the sultan from captivity, two years later, on November 1, 1922, pulled the plug on the sultan as well, and with a civilian coup, completely changed the regime.

Sabahattin Selek says: “Although the general atmosphere appeared to be one of loyalty to the Sultan and Caliph, many decisions and laws made by the Grand National Assembly revealed its revolutionary character.” (Anadolu İhtilali “Anatolian Revolution”, p.342)

On November 1, 1922, the Assembly abolished the sultanate; it also issued a decision stating that the Istanbul government had ceased to exist as of March 16, 1920, and that all its actions since then were null and void. (Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 1, Vol. 24, Issue 3, p. 314; Taha Akyol, Ama Hangi Atatürk “But Which Atatürk”, p. 352) This alone is enough to demonstrate the revolutionary character of the assembly.

Indeed, in the “Nutuk”, read in 1927, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk says, “It was necessary to rebel against the Ottoman government, the Ottoman sultan, and the Muslim caliph, and to incite the entire nation and army to rebel… My aim was to ensure that the first assembly to convene would be endowed from the outset with the authority to change the regime.” (Nutuk, “The Speech”, p.14, 412)

There were no political parties in the first assembly. The dominant force in the assembly was the First Group, which would later take the name the People's Party. Opposing them was a strong opposition known as the Second Group. These were not conservative individuals. On the contrary, they were democratic and liberal, opposing one-man rule. Most of them were supporters of Enver Pasha, dreaming that he would come and take over the movement. They formed the nucleus of the opposition in the Republican era.

One of the fiery opponents, Trabzon deputy Ali Şükrü Bey, was murdered by the personal bodyguard Topal Osman. This murder cast a shadow over the honor of the first assembly.

The First Group was sometimes so pressured by the opposition that Mustafa Kemal dissolved the assembly on June 28, 1923, and, in his own words, formed a “maiden-like assembly,” entirely composed of his own supporters (İsmail Habip Sevük, Atatürk İçin “For Atatürk”, p.53). It was this assembly that ratified the Treaty of Lausanne; even then, 14 deputies voted against it. The assembly, which would later move to its new building the following year and carry out the reforms in line with the Prominent Leader’s instructions, was now this one. Until the 1946 elections, assemblies bore the character of a party congress. Karabekir likened this assembly to a military headquarters with its aides-de-camp, orderly officers, and even its noncommissioned officers. (Paşaların Kavgası, “The Quarrel of the Pashas”, p.230)